# AFF

## 2AC

### 2AC: ET Thumper

#### NATO emerging tech co-op high now

Hudson, 22 -- former managing editor of the Wall Street Journal's European edition

[Richard L., and Florin Zubascu, "Science goes to war: western allies step up collaboration in military research," Science|Business, 4-7-2022, https://sciencebusiness.net/news/science-goes-war-western-allies-step-collaboration-military-research, accessed 6-5-2022]

Science goes to war: western allies step up collaboration in military research

The war in Ukraine prompts a series of new R&D collaborations on quantum, hypersonic and other military technologies – but also stirs some academic controversy in Europe

The war in Ukraine moved directly into the lab this week, with western governments announcing a series of new measures to coordinate their military research, including on quantum technologies and hypersonic missiles.

But the shift isn’t without controversy, as some European academics urged the EU to keep its civilian and defence research separate.

The military build-up took several steps, with NATO announcing a coordinated, multi-country research programme, and the US, Australia and UK setting plans for expanded quantum, hypersonic and other joint weapons research. It followed a NATO leaders’ meeting last autumn in which the strategy was set; but the scale and scope of the detailed measures announced this week were massive.

DIANA launch

Jens Stoltenberg, secretary general of NATO, announced this week that the UK and Estonia will host a joint military R&D programme involving research centres around the alliance. The Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) is expected to strengthen transatlantic cooperation on defence technologies and procurement.

The innovation accelerator will cover projects in artificial intelligence, big data, quantum technologies, biotechnology, hypersonics and space. “The goal of DIANA is to support deep technologies companies that contribute to defence,” said Estonian defence minister Kalle Laanet.

In the UK, Imperial College London will be the host organisation, coordinating what the UK government called “deep tech test centres” for military technologies, and a “virtual marketplace” to connect start-ups with investors and procurers.

The project is part of a broader NATO initiative to boost military research cooperation, that will ultimately involve as many as 60 sites. On 6 April, Denmark’s DTU research organisation said it and partners had been chosen to set up a NATO testing centre in Copenhagen for quantum technologies. Further announcements on other sites to be included are expected in coming weeks.

AUKUS cooperation

About the same time as the NATO news, the White House announced on 5 April that US, UK and Australian leaders had agreed to “accelerate investments to deliver generation-after-next quantum capabilities.” The R&D focus, it said, will be on “positioning, navigation and timing”, in trials over the next three years. Quantum sensors can provide ultra-precise atomic clocks, to guide ships or missiles.

The AUKUS Quantum Arrangement, as they called it, is part of a broader defence pact last year among the three nations in response to growing western concerns about Russia and China. The initial step last year was an agreement by the US and UK to supply nuclear-powered submarines to Australia – undercutting a rival French offer. But the latest discussions, as the Australian prime minister visited Washington, shows the three-way alliance widening to include other military technologies.

And separately from the overtly military news, on 5 April Finnish and US officials signed a joint statement pledging cooperation on a long list of quantum topics, including research, supply chains, education and values. The statement focuses on quantum benefits to the economy and society, and notably excludes mention of defence applications.

What role for Horizon Europe?

But the rapid-fire string of western announcements signals a seismic shift in how governments handle the delicate question of military versus civilian research. The European Commission is planning to expand the use of research funds for ‘dual-use’ defence technologies, but it’s unclear whether money from Horizon Europe, its €95.5 billion programme for civilian research, will actually end up being spent on developing weapons.

### 2AC: No NATO Unity

#### Post-Ukraine unity is collapsing

Lucas, 22 -- Center for European Policy Analysis nonresident fellow

[Edward Lucas, "NATO Is Out of Shape and Out of Date," Foreign Policy, 6-7-2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/07/nato-ukraine-russia-war-alliance-reform-geopolitics-military/, accessed 6-19-2022]

NATO Is Out of Shape and Out of Date

With the bloc’s unity over Ukraine showing cracks, NATO needs an overhaul.

Is NATO brain-dead or back in business? Less than three years ago, French President Emmanuel Macron famously diagnosed “the brain death of NATO.” Rhetoric aside, his point was fair at the time: Europe’s dearth of strategic thinking combined with the unpredictability of U.S. policy under then-President Donald Trump spelled serious trouble for the Cold War-era alliance.

Now, all talk is of NATO’s revival and resurgence. Russia’s war on Ukraine has given an urgent new relevance to the bloc’s core mission of territorial defense. NATO members appear to have found a new unity of purpose, supplying Ukraine with weapons, reassessing the threat from Russia, hiking defense budgets, and bolstering the security of the alliance’s eastern frontier. But the “honeymoon,” in the words of Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, was brief. As the war drags on, strains are showing, and the alliance is still shaky.

It’s true that NATO has come a long way. Only 14 years ago, the alliance’s top-secret threat assessment body, MC 161, was explicitly prohibited by its political masters from even considering any military danger from Russia in its scenarios. The pressure came not only from notorious Russia-huggers such as Germany but also from the United States, which was eager to keep east-west ties friendly. The Kremlin, the conventional wisdom insisted, was a partner, not an enemy. As a result, NATO’s most vulnerable members—Poland and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—remained second-class allies. They were in the bloc, but only on paper. There were no significant outside forces on their territory, and the alliance expressly refrained from making contingency plans to reinforce or even defend them in the event of attack. Poland demanded such plans and was told that they could be drawn up to defend the country against an attack by Belarus—but not by Russia.

Since Russia’s first attack on Ukraine in 2014, NATO plans and deployments have become more serious. There are 1,000-strong tripwire forces in the three Baltic states and a larger U.S. force in Poland. Since the start of the invasion in February, that presence has increased sharply. Moreover, two of the most advanced smaller military powers in Europe, Finland and Sweden, are banging on the alliance’s door. Assuming objections from Turkey can been smoothed out, they will be members by year’s end. That will fundamentally change the military geography of northeastern Europe.

Still more important is the stiffening of spines among the members. Trump’s much publicized distaste for NATO was based, in part, on the European members’ chronic underspending. At one point, the exasperated U.S. leader even tried to present a bill to his German counterpart, Chancellor Angela Merkel. Now, defense spending is rising across the alliance. That makes NATO an easier sell in Washington, especially as the case for U.S. engagement in European security is bolstered by the war in Ukraine.

Germany, the most notorious laggard, is suddenly splurging money on its decrepit armed forces—tanks that can’t trundle, ships that can’t go to sea, and soldiers who exercise with broomsticks instead of guns. It has agreed to meet NATO’s defense spending benchmark of 2 percent of GDP, set in 2006 and largely ignored thereafter. The latest country to announce a big hike in defense spending is Spain, currently lagging at barely 1 percent of GDP. The prime minister announced that this will double by 2024. That sets the scene nicely for the NATO summit in the Spanish capital later this month.

Yet look a little more closely, and the picture is far less rosy. Notwithstanding its apparent unity of purpose since the start of Russia’s war, NATO looks out of shape and out of date. In the run-up to their summit, the allies have been furiously haggling over the language in their new strategic concept, which will frame the alliance’s mission for the coming years and will be unveiled in Madrid. What will it say about Russia? About China? What sacrifices and risks are the member states really willing to accept? Are they willing to pool sovereignty in order to streamline decision-making?

Nothing in recent weeks suggests that these questions will get clear answers. For starters, the 30-strong alliance is unwieldy. In military terms, only a handful of members matter—above all, the United States—but in political terms, even little Luxembourg and Iceland get a voice. Worse, the political divides are huge. Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a semi-authoritarian state that flirts with Russia and fumes at what it considers European meddling over human rights. Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orban is taking a different but downward path, fusing wealth and power into a new system of control at home and undermining U.S. and European attempts to put pressure on Russia and China. Macron’s relentless posturing and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s foot-dragging create constant obstacles and distractions. The two leader’s weaknesses, on glorious display since the start of the war, have already enriched the language: Scholzen is a German neologism for “dither,” while makronic in Polish (and its equivalent in Ukrainian) can be roughly translated as “vacuous grandstanding while doing nothing.”

Macron and Scholz corrode decision-making with their foibles and thus place a big question mark over the alliance’s credibility and cohesion. Any threat or provocation from Russia is unlikely to be clear or conveniently timed. More likely it will be something deliberately ambiguous, such as a Russian drone that “accidentally” strays onto the territory of a front-line state and hits a target. Some countries would favor a tough response. Others would fear escalation and want dialogue. Still others would take the ambiguity as a convenient excuse to do nothing. Would the 30—soon to be 32—national representatives in the North Atlantic Council, the alliance’s deliberative body, really make a speedy and tough decision on how to react? More likely, some of them would plead for delay, diplomacy, and compromise. Those actually facing the possibility of attack would be far more hawkish, preferring a sharp military confrontation to even the smallest Russian victory. “Not one inch, not one soul,” a senior military figure from one of the Baltic states, speaking anonymously, told me. “We have seen what they did in Ukraine.”

The political weaknesses are matched by military ones. By far the most important country in the alliance is the United States. The U.S. security guarantee to Europe—with its threat of devastating conventional and, if necessary, nuclear response to any attack—is the cornerstone of the alliance. “All for one and one for all” sounds fine, but nobody in the Kremlin will tremble at the thought of Spanish, Dutch, or Canadian displeasure. Yet the result of this is a colossal dependence on U.S. capabilities, ranging from ammunition and spare parts (of which European countries’ stockpiles are notoriously skinny) to military transports that move forces quickly and efficiently over long distances. Even if Europe’s new defense spending plans materialize, they will not change the fact that only U.S. armed forces can move with the scale and speed necessary to defend territory from a country like Russia.

Conversely, the countries that most need defending—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—are the least able to bear the burden themselves. They need advanced weapons, particularly for air and missile defense, that they cannot afford themselves. The thin neck of land along the Polish-Lithuanian border, the so-called Suwalki Gap, is particularly vulnerable to attack from Russia’s militarized Kaliningrad exclave and Belarus, from which Russia attacked Ukraine. Poland and Lithuania both want a big U.S. military presence—either a permanent base or a persistent rotation of forces—to safeguard this strategic chokepoint.

Yet NATO command structures and planning do not fully reflect the imbalance of forces between the United States and Europe. They rely on the fiction that the European allies are more or less equal partners. Even military lightweights need to have important-sounding jobs and installations, making the North Atlantic Council the military version of a parliament dividing out the pork.

The resulting command structure is like a tangled pile of spaghetti. In the Baltic region alone, NATO has several multinational headquarters, one divisional headquarters split between Latvia and Denmark, another divisional headquarters in Poland, and a corps headquarters at a different location in Poland. Overall responsibility for the defense of Europe is divided between three Joint Forces Command headquarters in Naples, Italy; Brunssum, the Netherlands; and Norfolk, Virginia. But the top U.S. military commander in Europe, Air Force Gen. Tod Wolters, is based at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium. A maritime strategy for the Baltic Sea region has yet to be decided—which is just as well, because NATO has yet to create a naval headquarters for the region. Nor has the alliance drawn up real military plans for the reinforcement and defense of its northeastern members, let alone decided who would actually provide the forces and equipment in order to make them credible. Military mobility is meant to be the responsibility of Joint Support and Enabling Command, headquartered in Ulm, Germany, and originally set up as part of the European Union’s own defense policy.

A further problem is exercises: NATO does not conduct fully realistic, large-scale rehearsals of how it would respond to a Russian attack. One problem is that these are costly and disruptive. Another is that they expose the huge weaknesses of some NATO members, which can cope with a carefully scripted exercise but lack the ability to improvise. A third reason is the fear, in some countries, that practicing war-fighting would be provocative. Also lacking are detailed plans for fighting a war against Russia, covering such issues as reinforcing of front-line states, countering a Russian attack, regaining any temporarily occupied territory, and—most of all—dealing with a nuclear or other escalation. As a result, nobody is quite sure how anything would work in a crisis. Instead, another assumption reigns: that in a crisis, the United States would take over and do the heavy lifting on all fronts—logistics, intelligence, and combat.

To be fair, NATO is working on these problems, and all of them are fixable. But that does not mean that they are anywhere near being fixed. Wishful thinking remains the alliance’s besetting sin.

Worse, NATO is unprepared for the changing nature of modern warfare. Russia’s old-style assault on Ukraine is all too familiar. But the artillery bombardments and missile strikes that are grinding down Ukraine’s defenses are only part of the Kremlin’s arsenal. Its most effective weapons are nonmilitary: subversion, diplomatic divide-and-rule tactics, economic coercion, corruption, and propaganda. The most burning current example of nonmilitary warfare is Russia’s weaponizing of hunger. By blocking Ukraine’s grain exports, Russia has raised the specter of famine over millions of people, including in volatile and fragile countries in North Africa and the Middle East. Mass starvation is not just a humanitarian catastrophe, but its consequences include political unrest and mass migration, a direct threat to Europe. Yet NATO is ill-equipped to deal with this. It cannot mandate more economical use of grain—for example, by feeding less to livestock and stopping grain’s conversion to fuel. It has no food stockpiles to release to a hungry world. It cannot build new railways to ship Ukrainian grain through other routes. Nor can it insure merchant vessels that might—for a price—be willing to run Russia’s Black Sea blockade. NATO has little in-house expertise in countering Russian disinformation and almost zero influence in African and other countries susceptible to Kremlin narratives blaming the West for the food shortages that are already starting now.

NATO could acquire these capabilities. Or it could regain them: During the Cold War, the alliance had an economic warfare division and ran a program called the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls to prevent the Soviet bloc from acquiring sensitive technologies. But in the strategic timeout that followed the collapse of the Soviet bloc, these agencies and their skill sets shriveled and died.

But as with NATO’s military shortcomings, identifying the problems is not the same as solving them. And given the bloc’s unwieldy structure and issues with key members, it might be wise to lower expectations about NATO returning to Cold War levels of consistent readiness and effectiveness. A more realistic vision for the alliance would be to treat it as a framework for the most capable and threat-aware members to form coalitions of the willing. These groupings already exist: The British-led Joint Expeditionary Force, for example, is a 10-country framework for military cooperation, chiefly aimed at enabling very rapid deployments to the Nordic-Baltic region in the event of a crisis. France has a similar venture, the European Intervention Initiative. The five Nordic states have their own military club, called the Nordic Defence Cooperation, while Poland has close bilateral ties with Lithuania. A similar network of bilateral and multilateral ties would greatly strengthen the alliance’s floundering presence in the Black Sea and other regions, including North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean. These groupings would not supplant NATO but improve action and interoperability on top of the alliance’s established structures and mechanisms.

The difficult and underlying question here is the role of the United States. Europe is, in theory, big and rich enough to manage its own defense. But its persistent political weakness prevents that. The paradox is that only U.S. involvement makes NATO credible—yet overdependence on the United States also undermines the alliance’s credibility, while stoking resentment in France and elsewhere. The task for Washington is to encourage European allies to shoulder more of the burden and start thinking strategically again, even as it retains the superpower involvement that gives the alliance its decisive military edge. That is entirely doable. But don’t expect it to happen in Madrid—or anytime soon.

### 2AC: Accession Thumper

#### Turkey blocking new members sabotages NATO unity

McFall, 22 -- Fox News

[Caitlin McFall, "Erdogan disrupts NATO unity amid Putin’s threat to European security," Fox News, 5-26-2022, https://www.foxnews.com/world/erdogan-disrupts-nato-unity-putins-threat-european-security, accessed 6-19-2022]

Erdogan disrupts NATO unity amid Putin’s threat to European security

Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan negotiates political gains with NATO's expansion

Internal NATO relations have become increasingly strained following Turkey’s apparent refusal to allow Sweden and Finland into the fold, with fellow NATO member Greece becoming the latest European nation on Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan's chopping block.

Erdogan took a swing at Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis this week when he accused him of attempting to block a U.S. arms sale of F-16 fighter jets to Ankara.

"There's no longer anyone called Mitsotakis in my book," he told reporters following a Monday cabinet meeting.

The Turkish president also said he would refuse to meet his Greek counterpart for a previously planned summit later this year.

Erdogan’s comments came a week after the Greek prime minister met with U.S. lawmakers on Capitol Hill and urged them to consider NATO’s security when making "defense procurement decisions concerning the eastern Mediterranean."

"We are always open to dialogue. But there is only one framework we can use to resolve our differences – international law and the unwritten principle of good neighborly relations," Mitsotakis told U.S. lawmakers. "The last thing that NATO needs at a time when our focus is on helping Ukraine defeat Russia's aggression is another source of instability on NATO's southeastern flank."

The Greek prime minister did not mention Erdogan or neighboring Ankara, but his comments alluded to a long-standing spat with Turkey over alleged airspace violations.

Turkey and Greece, both of whom are NATO members, have shared a complex relationship for more than a century. But Athens and Ankara’s latest tiff amid Russia’s aggression in Europe could spell trouble for the very military alliance that Russian President Vladimir Putin would like to see dismantled.

"All nations act in their own self-interest, all the time," Michael Ryan, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO, told Fox News. "[Erdogan] defines the Turkish self-interests and he defines how they pursue it. And in this case, he views Turkey as a rising regional power, and he is pushing hard in every direction to certain Turkish prerogatives."

The NATO expert explained that the arms sale merely highlights several dynamics at play that Erdogan is juggling.

Turkey's defenses have been lagging since Washington blocked Ankara from purchasing U.S. F-35 warplanes in 2019 after it purchased the Russian-made S-400 missile system.

The White House at the time said, "The F-35 cannot coexist with a Russian intelligence-collection platform that will be used to learn about its advanced capabilities."

Turkey is looking to upgrade its air defense systems with modern U.S. F-16 aircraft not only to bolster its military capabilities amid its ongoing air disputes with Greece but to aid its operations in Syria.

"It’s a cat and mouse game," Ryan said. "Congress really does have something that the Turks want."

But he added that the "Turks have something that Congress wants – which is Sweden, Finland in NATO. That may be Erdogan’s play all along."

"The U.S. can’t have Erdogan calling the shots here," European policy expert Nile Gardiner, director of The Heritage Foundation’s Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, told Fox News.

"All NATO allies need to be able to work together. It breaks down if you have one or two countries who are trying to derail the future of the alliance – which is what Turkey is doing," he added.

The Greek prime minister’s veiled comments to U.S. lawmakers last week may have been an attempt to dissuade Washington from securing an arms sale with Turkey amid its NATO membership blockade.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has renewed the weight of NATO’s military alliance, particularly with regard to its Article 5 stipulation that says an attack on one country will trigger a united response from all 30 member nations.

Sweden and Finland formally requested to join NATO following Russia’s aggression in not only Ukraine but amid threats Moscow has issued against other European nations.

NATO military commanders championed the move to include Stockholm and Helsinki in the alliance and said it would bolster NATO defenses and identify "vulnerabilities" in Europe’s security.

But Turkey has used the opportunity to block the NATO bids over claims that Sweden and Finland have housed individuals it considers terrorists.

"The Turks are undermining NATO by taking this reckless stance," Gardiner warned. "President Erdogan has a clear choice between either helping NATO or weakening it, and he needs to be on the right side of history here, instead of appeasing the Russians."

Some foreign policy experts have suggested that Erdogan could be acting as Putin’s "Trojan horse" to strategically block NATO’s expansion and sow turmoil within the alliance.

But the former defense secretary for Europe and NATO rejected these claims.

### 2AC: No Taiwan War

**No China-Taiwan war**

Scobell and Stevenson-Yang, 3-4

[BY: Andrew Scobell, Ph.D.; Lucy Stevenson-Yang, United States Institute of Peace, March 4, 2022, “China Is Not Russia. Taiwan Is Not Ukraine.” <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/03/china-not-russia-taiwan-not-ukraine>, accessed 4-2-2022]

China Is Not Russia Russia under Putin has repeatedly dispatched its armed forces for combat missions overseas to a range of countries, including Georgia, Syria and Ukraine, as well as conducted major military interventions against other states, most recently Kazakhstan (albeit at the invitation of that country’s president). Moscow has also actively supported armed groups and militias in some of these same countries and others. **Although China has also been active and assertive in the use of its armed forces beyond its borders in recent years, Beijing has eschewed large-scale combat operations.** Around its periphery, China has engaged in provocations, confrontations and even violent clashes. **But China, unlike Russia, has refrained from massive interventions, invasions or occupations of other countries** since it invaded Vietnam in 1979. **China’s largest deployments of troops overseas in the post-Cold War era have been on U.N. Peacekeeping missions.** Whereas Russia has more than 20 military installations beyond its borders, to date, China has only one official military base on foreign soil — in Djibouti (established in 2017) — and a handful of other facilities it does not formally acknowledge. Of course, Beijing has a history of using its potent armed forces and muscular coercive apparatus within China’s borders to repress vigorously peaceful protesters, political dissidents and disaffected ethnic minority peoples. The locations of these operations include Beijing, Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as Hong Kong. China has also not hesitated to employ armed force and a wide array of coercive instruments around its periphery. This includes building roads and bunkers in remote frontier areas of the high Himalayas along its contested border with India and constructing artificial islands and military installations in disputed waters of the South China Sea. In recent years, China’s armed forces have also engaged in deadly clashes and violent confrontations with Indian army units along the disputed Line of Actual Control and harassed and rammed the fishing boats and coast guard vessels of Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries. Putin appears to relish projecting the image of a strongman who is routinely willing to thumb his nose at the rest of the world. By contrast, **Xi** — at least to date — **has mainly sought to cultivate a statesmanlike image on the global stage. At times he has given speeches attempting to cast China as a more responsible, less meddlesome and values-free version of the United States. And Xi has invested a lot of time and resources in promoting a set of high-profile international efforts intended to demonstrate that China is a constructive and proactive great power.** Employing positive rhetoric touting “win-win” solutions and aspirations to build a “community with a shared future for mankind,” China under Xi’s leadership has launched ambitious efforts such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Putin, by contrast, has made no real effort to offer an alternative to U.S. global leadership beyond delivering vague grandiose declarations (often in tandem with Xi) and has offered the world little in the way of economic stimulus beyond the prospect of more energy exports and hype about the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Despite consisting of only a handful of Soviet successor states, the EAEU is touted as Russia’s answer to China’s BRI. In terms of geostrategic activism, Russia’s major multilateralist initiatives have tended to involve China. These include the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 and the formation of the BRICS grouping in 2010. The former is a security community with a Central Asian focus consisting of Russia, China and four Central and two South Asian states. The latter is a loose association of some of the world’s largest “emerging economies”: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. However, Moscow’s most significant geostrategic maneuver under Putin has been to strengthen Russia’s strategic partnership with China. Both Beijing and Moscow insist that their relationship is not an alliance and their 2001 treaty of friendship — which was renewed in 2021 — does not commit either signatory to come to the defense of the other in case of military conflict. Yet, the Sino-Russian relationship is a clearly consequential alignment that has grown closer in recent years, particularly as their respective relationships with the United States have deteriorated. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has put China in a very uncomfortable position: Beijing does not want to antagonize Moscow but neither does it want to damage its relations with Washington and European capitals. Consequently, China has equivocated in its statements and actions. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has called for peace but has stopped short of condemning Russia or calling upon Moscow to withdraw its military. The lengthy joint statement of February 4, 2022, issued by Putin and Xi during the Russian leader’s visit to Beijing on the eve of the Winter Olympics, makes no mention at all of Ukraine — and China has pointedly abstained on all U.N. Security Council resolutions related to Russia’s invasion. Xi appears to have asked Putin to delay any military action against Ukraine until after the Olympics. Russia’s invasion poses other difficulties for China both in terms of running counter to Beijing’s long espoused principles in foreign affairs and its adverse impact on China’s national interests in Ukraine. Russia’s actions clearly contradict China’s cornerstone foreign policy principles of noninterference in other countries’ affairs and respecting territorial integrity. Moreover, China has sizable economic investments in Ukraine and is a good customer of Ukraine’s armaments industry. In 2020, Ukraine signed the BRI cooperation agreement, which further bolstered the economic relationship between the two countries and marked Ukraine as an important partner in Beijing’s signature foreign policy and economic initiative. Taiwan Is Not Ukraine The fact that Ukraine is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was almost certainly a decisive factor in Putin’s calculus to invade Ukraine. Russia’s commander in chief knew that his invading forces would likely not have to contend with the militaries of any other countries. And if there were any lingering doubts in the Kremlin about the disposition of the most powerful member of NATO, U.S. President Joe Biden stated publicly that the United States would not send military forces to help defend Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Biden administration has taken strong steps to reinforce NATO allies in Eastern Europe and provide robust military assistance to Ukraine. By contrast, **Xi and his Politburo colleagues have long been convinced that Taiwan has the resolute support of the world’s most capable military. The People’s Liberation Army** — as all branches of China’s armed forces are known — **continues to assume that if it launches an invasion of Taiwan, the U.S. military will swiftly and decisively intervene.** The U.S.-Taiwan relationship, while technically “unofficial” due to the One China policy, has strengthened in recent years. On February 28, **the Biden administration sent an unofficial delegation of former U.S. defense and national security officials to Taiwan as a signal to China of that commitment. It remains true that the greatest deterrence to a massive Chinese military attack on the island is Beijing’s assumption that war with Taiwan also means a war with the United States.** However, there is no formal military alliance between the United States and Taiwan. The defense pact binding Washington to Taipei was formally abrogated in 1979. So why is Beijing convinced that Washington has an ironclad alliance-like relationship with Taiwan? There are at least two reasons. First, successive U.S. administrations have publicly committed themselves to support Taiwan against Chinese aggression and have regularly sold arms to the island’s armed forces. Second, although there is no language in the1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) that explicitly commits the United States to come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack on the island by China, many in Washington believe that such a commitment exists. While there are different interpretations as to what the TRA means, the most significant fact is that the vast majority of U.S. political and military leaders are fully convinced that this legislation binds the United States to a de facto alliance with Taiwan. China’s increased military assertiveness and greater level of armed provocations in the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere around China’s periphery in recent years have only served to strengthen the conviction in Washington that the island is a staunch democratic partner worthy of U.S. support as it tries to defend tiny Taiwan against efforts by Beijing to coerce the island into unwanted unification with China. However, Taiwan, unlike Ukraine, is not a member of the United Nation. While Ukraine has ambassador-level diplomatic relations with more than 180 countries, including China and the United States, Taiwan only has full diplomatic ties with approximately a dozen countries and none of these are major powers. Yet, thanks to the TRA, Taipei enjoys robust quasi-diplomatic relations with Washington, and thanks to Taiwan’s pragmatic ingenuity, the island possesses a vibrant worldwide network of de facto diplomatic missions. Although Ukraine’s diplomatic standing is far superior to Taiwan’s, the European country’s military alliance status is less impressive — Ukraine is not a member of NATO, although it is a very active member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace initiative. While Taiwan also has no formal military allies, the island has several close and consequential security partners, most notably the United States. China Is China and Taiwan Is Taiwan Taiwan continues to be the most contentious issue in U.S.-China relations. Moreover, the Taiwan Strait is routinely identified as the most plausible location of a military confrontation between the United States and China. For Xi and his Politburo colleagues, Taiwan looms large and is prominently identified as a “core” national interest of China’s, with Xi reiterating in 2021 that “resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China’s complete reunification is a historic mission and an unshakable commitment of the Communist Party of China” and that “no one should underestimate the resolve, the will, and the ability of the Chinese people to defend their national sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Moreover, most Chinese citizens consider Taiwan to be Chinese territory and view the island as something worth fighting for. Indeed, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has staked its political legitimacy on the ultimate goal of unifying Taiwan with China and in the meantime is working resolutely to prevent the island from becoming de jureindependent. Beijing’s preferred means of realizing unification or preventing independence is peaceful but the CCP has never renounced the use of armed force. Furthermore, the PLA’s central warfighting scenario is Taiwan and China’s military has been focused on planning and preparing for an operation against the island for decades. A Cautionary Tale? The above differences notwithstanding, Russia’s combat experience in Ukraine will have a spillover impact on how China thinks about Taiwan. If the Russian armed forces remain bogged down in a stalemate in Ukraine for an extended period and/or face a prolonged and widespread insurgency, this may give Xi and his fellow Politburo members pause. If Russia’s military experiences major setbacks and perhaps even embarrassing defeats, this may make China’s political leaders think twice about the advisability of an invasion of Taiwan. After all, an invasion of Ukraine is relatively straightforward — the country is geographically contiguous to Russia, sharing an extended land border with mostly gentle terrain. By contrast, an invasion of the island of Taiwan is a far more complex operation — a successful campaign requires careful planning and coordinated execution between air, naval and ground forces. It would also involve amphibious landings in addition to considerable urban warfare — on an even larger scale than in Ukraine — including operations on rugged mountainous terrain. Certainly, the PLA will carefully study Russia’s Ukrainian campaign and draw lessons from it, much as they have studied campaigns of other major powers. Such analyses are conducted with great seriousness because China’s armed forces themselves have not fought a major war since 1979 (when Chinese forces invaded Vietnam) and have not conducted a major island landing campaign since 1950 (against Hainan Island). **One way that China’s leadership might be taking notes from Russia’s Ukraine invasion is by rethinking the risks associated with escalation.** In addition to noting the potential military embarrassment that Russia is facing, **China might be wary of the sweeping economic sanctions levied by the international community. If China were to receive similar backlash for an invasion of Taiwan, it would raise the possibility of truly crippling sanctions at a time when the Chinese economy is experiencing anemic growth and structural challenges.** In particular, the weaponization of the SWIFT payments system might give China pause. Russia has been trying to popularize a cross-border financial information transmission system, and China is committed to developing the CIPS payment network, but neither has had significant success outside Russian or Chinese borders**. Despite its flaws, SWIFT remains the most efficient system for international financial transactions for banks and being removed from SWIFT could potentially be devastating to the Chinese economy. Furthermore, the lessons of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to date are that the costs of armed aggression are high in blood and treasure, as well as strong international censure of Moscow and a resolute collective response by NATO member countries.**

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### 1AR: ET Thumper

#### Emerging tech co-op high now

Harper, 22 -- Managing Editor of DefenseScoop

[Jon Harper, "Emerging tech to have prominent role in NATO's new strategic concept," FedScoop, 6-1-2022, https://www.fedscoop.com/emerging-tech-to-have-prominent-role-in-natos-new-strategic-concept%EF%BF%BC/, accessed 6-4-2022]

Emerging tech to have prominent role in NATO’s new strategic concept

Emerging and disruptive technologies will be a key focus area of NATO’s new Strategic Concept which will be unveiled later this month, the U.S. ambassador to the alliance told reporters Wednesday.

The document is expected to be adopted at the upcoming NATO summit in Madrid, marking the first time in more than a decade that the transatlantic military pact has released a new Strategic Concept. The guidance sets the alliance’s strategy and security tasks, outlines the challenges and opportunities it faces in a changing security environment, and provides direction for its political and military implementation.

There will be “a lot on new threats and challenges, a heavier emphasis on things like emerging and disruptive technologies, heavier emphasis on new domains like cyber and space, more on climate change,” U.S. Ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith told the Defense Writers Group in Washington.

### 1AR: No NATO Unity

#### Post-Ukraine unity is collapsing

Ramesh, 22 -- News9 Staff

[KV, "European unity starts fraying as Ukraine War stretches past 90 days," NewsNine, 5-27-2022, https://www.news9live.com/opinion-blogs/european-unity-starts-fraying-as-ukraine-war-stretches-past-90-days-172746, accessed 6-19-2022]

European unity starts fraying as Ukraine War stretches past 90 days

With the Ukraine conflict in its ninth week, Europe’s unity shows cracks Poland lashes out at Germany on tanks, at Norway over gas prices Turkey, Hungary and Serbia project their own nationalist agendas

Even as the US tries to put up a pan-European front against Moscow, the initial unity among the EU-NATO partners born out of the shock of Russia invading Ukraine seems to be showing chinks. Countries within the EU and NATO are scuffling with each other over bilateral issues, all of which have roots in the Ukraine conflict, or have a bearing on the ongoing war. Of broken promises The latest row is between Poland and Germany, with the former accusing Berlin of reneging on an agreement to supply Warsaw with new German tanks as compensation for Polish deliveries of Soviet-era tanks to Ukraine.

Polish President Andrzej Duda on Tuesday accused Germany of breaking an agreement to supply Warsaw with new tanks as compensation for Polish deliveries of Soviet-era tanks to Ukraine, a claim rejected by Berlin. In April, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz introduced "Ringtausch," a swap scheme under which eastern NATO partners would supply the Ukrainian army with Soviet-era tanks like the T-72 in exchange for modern western tanks from German manufacturers, such as the Leopard.

Scholz argued that the arrangement would benefit Ukraine because its soldiers and mechanics are already familiar with Soviet-era tanks, while eastern NATO countries receive an upgrade for giving up their tanks. "They (the Germans) have not fulfilled this promise. And frankly, we are very disappointed about this," the Polish president told Die Welt on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos.

"We have provided Ukraine with a large number of tanks … because we believe it is our responsibility as a neighbour," Duda told the interviewer. Tanks for Ukraine According to reports, Warsaw passed on at least 240 Soviet-era tanks to the Ukrainian military. "By doing so, we depleted our own military potential and stockpiles," he argued. The German government rejected Duda's claims. "The federal government is flabbergasted, that's how I would put it," government spokesman Steffen Hebestreit said Wednesday when asked for a reaction during a press conference in Berlin.

"There was a clear request from the Polish side to transfer state-of-the-art Leopard 2A7 main battle tanks to Poland, but the problem is that the Bundeswehr itself only has a small number — about 50 — of these tanks," he said, adding that while "more are in the pipeline, they are not standing on a car yard or factory site anywhere; they have to be manufactured." Claims and counterclaims Sticking yet another knife in Berlin's side, Polish prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki criticised Chancellor Scholz for his refusal to travel to Kyiv. "I think he should do that," Morawiecki told Die Welt. He added, "There is nothing better than visiting the capital of the fighting nation to realise the seriousness of the situation, to get a sense of the importance of all that is happening there." Scholz has refused to travel to the Ukrainian capital for the moment, arguing that he had already gone there 10 days before the Russian invasion started, and would not go again "for a quick in and out with a photoshoot". "If [I go to Kyiv], then it's always about very specific things. And they have to be prepared," Scholz told German television RTL last week. German officials feel that Poland is trying to profit from its outward generosity to Kyiv. In lieu of the old Soviet-era tanks they have passed to Ukraine, the Poles are demanding that Germany recompense it with new, modern German tanks. The leaders in Warsaw seem to target everyone else in Europe, to flaunt that they have been at the forefront of the effort to support Ukraine, while other countries remained laggards. Their hostility to Putin has resulted in Russia cutting off gas supplies to Poland after the latter refused to pay for the supplies in rubles as demanded by Moscow. In frustration, Poland hit out at gas-rich Norway, a member of the EU and NATO, accusing it of profiteering from the war. On Sunday, Morawiecki claimed that Norway would earn an extra €100 billion ($106.9 billion) from energy sales this year due to a spike in oil and gas prices caused by the conflict in Ukraine and international sanctions on Russia, and demanded that the Nordic country share its bounty with Kyiv, while obliquely suggesting that his country too deserved a share. Morawiecki argued that Oslo shouldn't necessarily send its money to Poland, but to Ukraine. He even suggested that Polish students lobby with their Norwegian friends to pressure their country. Not profiteering says Norway Norway hit back, making it clear that it would not give in to Poland's demand. Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Eivind Vad Petersson denied that his country was profiteering from the war. He argued that the excess oil and gas revenues go into the country's pension fund, also known as the Oil Fund, which was established in 1990 to make sure that this wealth serves the current and future generations of Norwegians. Norway has arguably the best public welfare programme and social safety net in the world, financed by its hydrocarbon revenues. But the pension fund has lost 550 billion Norwegian krone (around $56 billion) due to turbulence in the stock market, Petersson said. In support of Moscow Elsewhere in Europe, countries like Hungary and Serbia maintained their countries' indirect support to Moscow. Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban has been a firm supporter of Putin and has refused flatly to join the sanctions of the West against Russia. He has categorically refused to abide by the EU sanctions on buying gas and oil from Russia, arguing that his country just could not do without Russian fuel supplies. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic echoed Orban's line, declaring on Wednesday that despite pressure from the EU, Belgrade would pursue its own independent policy. "Right now, there is no such possibility," Vucic informed Serbian state broadcaster RTS when asked if Serbia could impose sanctions on Moscow. Serbia has steadfastly refused to join NATO but has applied for membership in the EU. "We look out for our own interests," Vucic said. "Who knows what kind of threats we may face, but as you see, it's been 90 days and Serbia is standing by its policy, the only country in all of Europe. A small country with people small in numbers but very proud is following its own policy – not pro-Russian, not pro-Western, but its own," he pointed out. "You now talk about the territorial integrity of Ukraine, but you didn't talk that way 23 years ago," Vucic said, referring to the 1999 NATO war that led to the Serbian province of Kosovo becoming independent thanks to backing from the US and its allies. Threats from Turkey And worsening yet another headache for the EU, Turkish government spokesman Ibrahim Kalin said his government would not allow Finland and Sweden into the NATO alliance until Turkey's "concrete" security concerns regarding terrorism and sanctions are met. Kalin's remarks came at the end of five-hour-long talks between delegations from Sweden and Finland with their Turkish counterparts in Ankara to discuss their joint applications to join NATO last week. Their admission to NATO needs the unanimous consent of all 30 member states, and Turkey has threatened to block the accession process unless the two countries crackdown on groups it considers terrorists. Turkey has demanded that the two Nordic countries lift arms export restrictions on Turkey, and extradite activists of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Gulen movement (FETO) who have sought haven in the two countries. The differences within the EU that have hobbled its efforts for a unified and aggressive response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, may come to a head-on May 30 and 31, when the countries' leaders meet in a summit in Brussels. Countries express disquiet As the war in Ukraine shows signs of prolonging, voices expressing disquiet over the way the West is handling the crisis appear to be getting louder. At the EU summit, Cyprus, Italy, and Hungary are likely to table a resolution demanding a ceasefire in Ukraine and opening peace talks aimed at resolving the conflict. Tempers seem to be fraying among the allies and the verbal exchanges seem to be becoming rough, with Ukraine brusquely dismissing a suggestion by Henry Kissinger that Ukraine's borders be set at the pre-invasion status quo. Ukraine demands that the Russian forces withdraw to the pre-2014 level. Kissinger's suggestion is more in line with the Russian recognition of the rebel provinces of Donetsk and Lugansk as independent republics. Addressing the World Economic Forum in Davos, Kissinger suggested that Ukraine give up the two provinces to buy lasting peace with Russia. He said further alienation of Russia might force it to become a strong and permanent ally of China, endangering global security. Ukrainian presidential adviser Alexey Arestovich flew off the handle at the suggestion that Ukraine barter territory for peace with Russia.

#### Domestic backlash ensures fraying unity the longer the war goes on

Ellyatt, 22 -- CNBC international correspondent in London

[Holly Ellyatt, “The West’s unity over Ukraine could be starting to crack, just as Russia’s invasion gains ground,” CNBC, 6-16-2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/16/us-europe-unity-over-ukraine-is-starting-to-crack-amid-russia-onslaught.html, accessed 6-19-2022]

The West’s unity over Ukraine could be starting to crack, just as Russia’s invasion gains ground

Western unity over the war in Ukraine is becoming more vulnerable as the conflict drags on.

One poll across Europe found a majority of people want an end to the war as soon as possible, even if it means territorial losses for Ukraine.

There is an increasing level of concern among the public in Europe, and beyond, about rising living costs.

There are increasing signs that Western unity over the war in Ukraine could be starting to crack as the conflict drags on and leaders face public discontent over rampant inflation and the cost-of-living crisis.

There are widespread concerns over how long the war could continue, with some strategists saying it has all the hallmarks of a war of attrition where no side “wins” and the losses and damage inflicted by both sides, over a protracted and prolonged period, are immense.

The U.S., U.K. and Eastern Europe appear staunch in their position that Russia must not be able to succeed or “win” in Ukraine by carving out (or reclaiming, as Moscow sees it) swathes of territory for itself, saying that could have major global geopolitical repercussions.

They have also been clear that it is Ukraine that must decide if, and when, it wants to negotiate with Russia over a peace deal. For its part, Kyiv has said it is willing to conduct talks but that it has red lines, chiefly, that it is not willing to concede any territory to Russia.

Nonetheless, there appears to be a faction within Europe — namely France, Italy and Germany — that are hoping for a peace deal sooner rather than later.

On Wednesday, French President Emmanuel Macron said Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his officials will have to negotiate with Russia “at some point.”

Macron and his German and Italian counterparts (who are all in Kyiv on Thursday) have all called for a cease-fire and for a negotiated end to the war, urging Russian President Vladimir Putin to hold peace talks with Zelenskyy, to no avail.

In the meantime, Ukraine continues to plead for more weapons from its Western allies, with NATO officials meeting this week in Brussels to discuss Kyiv’s urgent need for more arms.

It comes as Russia makes gains in eastern Ukraine largely as a result of its relentless artillery bombardment of the Donbas. Russian forces are making slow but steady progress in seizing more parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions where two pro-Russian separatist “republics” are located, which Moscow is intent on, as it says, “liberating” from Ukraine.

The West continues to help Ukraine; U.S. President Joe Biden said Wednesday that his administration will send $1 billion more in weapons to Kyiv, as well as another $225 million in humanitarian aid. For Kyiv, the weapons can’t arrive quickly enough.

But questions are now being asked over how long its military assistance can last, particularly if the conflict continues for years.

Pentagon spokesman John Kirby was asked on CNN how much Biden is prepared to spend on Ukraine, given the inflation crisis and economic pressures the U.S. is facing at home. Data released last Friday showed the U.S. consumer price index rose 8.6% in May from a year ago, the highest increase since December 1981, with similarly elevated levels in Europe (the rate hit a 40-year high of 9% in the U.K. in April).

Saying Ukraine was “a key priority” for the president, Kirby said the U.S. will “do as much as we can for as long as we can,” reiterating that the latest promise of weapons was just one small part of the larger $40 billion in aid approved by Congress.

“This is the first tranche announced inside that $40 billion total package. So we still have quite a way to go here ... How long can all that last? How long will the war last? Nobody can be sure,” Kirby said.

“We know and predicted that the fight in the Donbas was going to be a slog, that it was going to probably stretch this war out many months. And it seems as if that’s bearing fruit now.”

Western leaders under pressure

When Russia’s invasion started on Feb. 24, the West’s unified opposition to the war, and robust response in imposing a raft of tough sanctions imposed on it, was striking.

Four months into the conflict, however, and Western leaders are increasingly coming under pressure from their electorates as the fallout from the conflict — essentially, soaring food and energy costs as a result of supply chain disruptions and sanctions on Russia — hit consumers hard.

Summing up the dilemma facing officials, Helima Croft, head of global commodity strategy and MENA research at RBC Capital Markets, said, ”‘What is the price you are willing to pay?’ has seemingly emerged as the central question of the summer, as Western leaders seek to balance their desire to support the Ukrainian resistance with their urgent imperative to tame inflation and stave off recessions.”

There appears to be a geographic dimension to this divide, Croft noted in her note Wednesday. “U.S., U.K. and eastern European leaders seem to be the staunchest defenders of the principle that Ukrainians will determine what constitutes a just peace and have expressed strong commitments to defending Ukraine’s territorial integrity.”

However, she said, “officials from continental Europe and many developing nations, on the other hand, appear more inclined to call for a compromise that will provide Putin with a ‘golden bridge’ to retreat across.”

Croft said she had recently attended meetings and policy forums where “there was an appreciable divide” between those officials calling for more fulsome military assistance for Ukraine, and “those suggesting that it is time for Ukraine to consider making concessions at the negotiating table, citing the ruinous impact of rising commodity prices.”

Europeans divided

A pan-European poll released Wednesday also indicated that Europeans’ sense of unity over the war in Ukraine could be starting to wane.

The study by the European Council on Foreign Relations think tank found an increasing level of concern among the public over the costs of economic sanctions and the threat of nuclear escalation, in particular. It was based on polling of more than 8,000 people between April 28 and May 11 across nine EU countries.

Some 35% of those questioned wanted to see an end to the conflict even if it meant Ukraine conceding territory to Russia, whereas 22% said they were more interested in seeing Russia punished for its aggression, even if it meant prolonging the war.

In addition, a growing number of people said they were worried that their governments were prioritizing the war ahead of other issues, such as the cost-of-living crisis.

“Many in Europe want the war to end as soon as possible — even if it means territorial losses for Ukraine - and believe that the EU, rather than the U.S. or China, will be ‘worse off’ as a result of this conflict,” the report on the poll’s findings, co-authored by Mark Leonard and Ivan Krastev, said.

“Unless something dramatically changes, Europeans will oppose a long and protracted war. Only in Poland, Germany, Sweden, and Finland is there substantial public support for boosting military spending.”

#### NATO unity crumbling

Murray, 22 – The Telegraph

[Douglas Murray, "Nato’s united front is crumbling now that Putin has been humiliated in Ukraine," Telegraph, 5-23-2022, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2022/05/23/natos-united-front-crumbling-now-putin-has-humiliated-ukraine/, accessed 6-19-2022]

Nato’s united front is crumbling now that Putin has been humiliated in Ukraine

Western unity will be sorely tested if the conflict turns into a war of attrition with no side claiming victory

Aquarter of a year has now passed since Vladimir Putin sent his tanks into Ukraine. And the first drafts of history have already been written. Their rough conclusions seem to go along the following lines.

First, to add to Talleyrand’s famous phrase, Putin has committed both a crime and a blunder. The Russian military has shown itself to be corrupt and inefficient. The Ukrainians have shown themselves to be quite astonishingly stalwart defenders of their homeland. And the West has shown itself to be unpredictably united.

Of course, the problem with first drafts of history is that, while they may be finished with history, history is not finished with them. The conflict in Ukraine could still go in any number of directions. And while a Russian victory now looks unlikely, it is not obvious that Ukraine will emerge with its territory intact. Putin himself may yet act as dictators can when cornered. And while much of the world moves on, it is perfectly possible that the invasion of Ukraine becomes a conflict of attrition which goes on for a long time to come.

Yet it is on the question of the West that I am particularly uncertain about the first drafts currently circulating.

In some ways it is true that the Western alliances – especially Nato – have never looked stronger or more united. For 30 years, we had discussions of “whither Nato”. I took part in many of them myself. Well, the answer is the one that was staring us in the face all along. Any and all questions about the point of Nato fell apart the moment the Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine. The applications for membership from Sweden and other countries are a fine reminder of that fact. The swiftness with which the Western banking system and political sanction systems snapped into place was likewise a rather impressive moment of unity.

And yet, for all the talk of the West acting in concert, when it comes to responding to Putin’s aggression, the picture is far more fractious – and becoming more so. As far as I can see, there are three or four factions within what we might still call the Western alliance, and their various positions appear to be diverging as the war drags on.

First are those countries, including the UK, which foresaw Russia’s aggression and acted swiftly to support and arm our Ukrainian allies. It is this part of the Western alliance which is presenting the world with a vision of a united front. It is also this part that is most clear in its view that Putin must be seen to fail because, as President Zelensky put it yesterday, brute force must not be allowed to rule the world.

But other camps remain. They have not fallen into line behind the likes of the UK, as some had expected. There are those who are indebted, not to say compromised, by their recent arrangements with Russia. Despite its promises of change, the most important country in Europe – Germany – is still severely compromised, from the top of its politics down, by decades-long cosying up to Putin. For energy reasons, and much more, there is still a strong strain of thought in Berlin which disdains what the British are doing in Ukraine.

They would like to go back to the status quo ante, to be able to import Russian energy cheaply and pass those gains on to German taxpayers, the better to grandstand about green energy and much more. Their promises of rearmament have so far come to little. The prolongation of the conflict has not encouraged them to shift faster away from their prior approach, but to drag their heels and hope that the old world can be restored. Olaf Scholz, the German Chancellor, has hesitated while others have acted.

Then there is the camp of the Elysée and the president there who believes that, if he keeps a line open with Putin, he might in some way solve the conflict. It is understandable that President Zelensky and others have lost patience with President Macron. For the French leader has done more than act as a middleman and he has done more than play both sides. He has dared to give advice to the Ukrainians such as (in a speech earlier this month) warning them not to give in to “temptation of humiliation or of the spirit of revenge”.

It is easy to sit in Paris and tell Ukrainians not to feel vengeful towards Russia. The Russians tanks did not roll into the French capital. Russian troops have not been committing war crimes in French towns and cities. Nevertheless, Macron seems to be limbering up to play the negotiating middleman – the person willing to offer up a portion of another nation’s territory, in a deal which he would never accept were the territory his own.

What makes all this much more difficult now is that there is a definite sense – most especially in Washington – that an opportunity has arisen to tie down Russia. This is the final camp. These are people who seem to see Putin’s slip-up as the perfect moment to not just encourage a Russian defeat but to enable a Kremlin catastrophe, perhaps by miring its forces in a conflict that they can never win.

A weakened Putin would undeniably have certain advantages. It would be good if he is no threat for some decades to come. But this theory forgets. firstly. that a prolonged conflict is easy to wish on people from thousands of miles away, less agreeable for the citizens of the Donbas and other regions. It also ignores the other consequences of this war continuing, including the impact of Russia’s blockade of Ukrainian food exports.

And if the point of this strategy is to somehow push Putin from office, that is simply not in the West’s power, even if it was agreed to be a desirable objective. Russian history suggests that palace coups do not always end bloodlessly. The US has a plan for how to get the nukes out of Pakistan if the Islamists ever take over that country. Does anyone have a plan for how to secure Russia’s nuclear sites if there is a putsch and internecine war at the top of Russian politics? The people urging regime change in Moscow ought to hope there is such a plan.

So the Western alliance is not as cohesive as we might like to think. Yes, we have been shocked by Putin this year. Yes we have been appalled by his actions. But about the question of what to do? That remains deeply unclear. The West is united in horror. But we are divided over what to do in its face.

### 1AR: Accession Thumper

#### Turkey is disrupting NATO unity

Crowley, 22 -- NY Times Washington Bureau diplomatic correspondent

[Michael Crowley and Steven Erlanger, "For NATO, Turkey Is a Disruptive Ally," NY Times, 5-30-2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/30/us/politics/turkey-nato-russia.html, accessed 6-19-2022]

For NATO, Turkey Is a Disruptive Ally

When President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey threatened this month to block NATO membership for Finland and Sweden, Western officials were exasperated — but not shocked.

Within an alliance that operates by consensus, the Turkish strongman has come to be seen as something of a stickup artist. In 2009, he blocked the appointment of a new NATO chief from Denmark, complaining that the country was too tolerant of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad and too sympathetic to “Kurdish terrorists” based in Turkey. It took hours of cajoling by Western leaders, and a face-to-face promise from President Barack Obama that NATO would appoint a Turk to a leadership position, to satisfy Mr. Erdogan.

After a rupture in relations between Turkey and Israel the next year, Mr. Erdogan prevented the alliance from working with the Jewish state for six years. A few years later, Mr. Erdogan delayed for months a NATO plan to fortify Eastern European countries against Russia, again citing Kurdish militants and demanding that the alliance declare ones operating in Syria to be terrorists. In 2020, Mr. Erdogan sent a gas-exploration ship backed by fighter jets close to Greek waters, causing France to send ships in support of Greece, also a NATO member.

Now the Turkish leader is back in the role of obstructionist, and is once again invoking the Kurds, as he charges that Sweden and Finland sympathize with the Kurdish militants he has made his main enemy.

“These countries have almost become guesthouses for terrorist organizations,” he said this month. “It is not possible for us to be in favor.”

Mr. Erdogan’s stance is a reminder of a long-festering problem for NATO, which currently has 30 members. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may have given the alliance a new sense of mission, but NATO must still contend with an authoritarian leader willing to use his leverage to gain political points at home by blocking consensus — at least for a time.

It is a situation that plays to the advantage of President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, who has grown friendlier with Mr. Erdogan in recent years. For the Russian leader, the rejection of Swedish and Finnish admission into NATO would be a significant victory.

The quandary would be simpler were it not for Turkey’s importance to the alliance. The country joined NATO in 1952 after aligning with the West against the Soviet Union; Turkey gives the alliance a crucial strategic position at the intersection of Europe and Asia, astride both the Middle East and the Black Sea. It hosts a major U.S. air base where American nuclear weapons are stored, and Mr. Erdogan has blocked Russian warships headed toward Ukraine.

But under Mr. Erdogan, Turkey has increasingly become a problem to be managed. As prime minister and then as president, he has tilted his country away from Europe while practicing an authoritarian and populist brand of Islamist politics, especially since a failed coup attempt in 2016.

He has purchased an advanced missile system from Russia that NATO officials call a threat to their integrated defense systems, and in 2019 he mounted a military incursion to battle Kurds in northern Syria who were aiding the fight against the Islamic State with U.S. support.

“In my four years there, it was quite often 27 against one,” said Ivo H. Daalder, a U.S. ambassador to NATO during the Obama administration, when the alliance had 28 members.

#### Turkey collapsing NATO unity

Erlanger, 22 -- NY Times chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe

[Steven Erlanger and Matina Stevis-Gridneff, "Strongmen in Turkey and Hungary Stall Unity in NATO and the E.U.," NY Times, 5-18-2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/18/world/europe/sweden-finland-nato-turkey-oil.html, accessed 6-19-2022]

Strongmen in Turkey and Hungary Stall Unity in NATO and the E.U.

Russia benefits as Turkey slows down Swedish and Finnish applications to NATO and Hungary continues to block an E.U. embargo on Russian oil.

Europe’s effort to stand up to Russia and Vladimir V. Putin, its president, is being slowed by two strongmen leaders insisting on the priority of their national interests and playing to domestic audiences.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey on Wednesday blocked a procedural vote on NATO moving ahead quickly with the membership applications of Sweden and Finland, handed in with much publicity Wednesday morning, a senior European diplomat said.

And Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary continues to block even a watered-down European Union effort to put an embargo on Russian oil, part of a sixth package of sanctions aimed at Moscow for its war against Ukraine.

While NATO and the European Union have shown remarkable unity in their response to Mr. Putin’s war, the actions of the two authoritarian leaders show the strains building as the war drags on, peace talks appear to go nowhere, and Western sanctions are contributing to economic pain and high inflation at home, as well as in Russia.

Mr. Erdogan and Mr. Orban may be outliers in their organizations, but they are able to use the requirement for consensus in both NATO and the European Union to get their political concerns addressed by blocking the action of all the others, even temporarily.

#### Turkey won’t change their mind

Hacaoglu, 22 – Bloomberg News

[Selcan Hacaoglu, and Natalia Drozdiak, "Turkey Says Position on NATO Won’t Change in Blow to June Summit," Bloomberg, 6-15-2022, https://www.yahoo.com/video/turkey-says-position-nato-won-134859990.html, accessed 6-19-2022]

Turkey Says Position on NATO Won’t Change in Blow to June Summit

Turkey is maintaining its opposition to Sweden and Finland joining NATO unless they address its security concerns, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said, leaving little hope that enlargement of the bloc could get underway by a summit this month.

### 1AR: China Answers

**China does not have the capabilities launch a full-scale war against Taiwan – not enough ships, geography prevents, and Taiwan’s infrastructure not sufficient for full-scale attack.**

**Ullman, 2/18** - Senior Advisor at the Atlantic Council

[Dr. Harlan Ullman, Senior Advisor at the Atlantic Council, February 18, 2022, “Reality Check #10: China will not invade Taiwan,” <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/reality-check/reality-check-10-china-will-not-invade-taiwan/>, accessed 4-2-2022]

Despite Beijing’s longstanding desire to invade and conquer Taiwan and achieve “one China,” **China simply lacks the military capability and capacity to launch a full-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan for the foreseeable future. With a potential defending force of 450,000 Taiwanese today, using the traditional three-to-one ratio of attackers to defenders taught at war colleges, to undertake an invasion, China would need over 1.2 million soldiers (out of a total active force of over 2 million) that would have to be transported in many thousands of ships.** Although Beijing is unlikely to launch a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, given China’s strength, autocratic government, and ambitions, the United States cannot totally ignore the risk of such an attack. At the same time, however, Washington should develop an overall strategy designed to deter the most likely scenarios—such as imposing economic and financial embargoes on Taiwan, imposing a maritime blockade of the island, or attempting a regime change from within—or prevail militarily if deterrence fails. China does have many other options for pressuring Taiwan. What’s the issue? The Trump administration’s National Defense Strategy (NDS) was substantially predicated on preventing two faits accomplis: a Russian invasion of the Baltics and a Chinese amphibious assault on Taiwan. To what degree these scenarios will survive the Biden administration’s soon-to- be-released strategic review remains to be seen. The most likely outcome is that “integrated deterrence,” Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s term—for now more a slogan than a strategic concept that attempts a more “wholistic” all-of-government effort—will become prominent, as will a greater focus on the “deter” element rather than on “defeat” as was the last NDS. Defining what defeat means and how it would be achieved remains elusive. Some observers believe that how the United States handles the Ukraine crisis will be closely watched by China. That is true. But, as this paper argues, the Ukraine crisis will not influence Chinese decisions on whether or not to launch a full-scale amphibious invasion because, given the force demands, China simply lacks the capacity to do so for the foreseeable future. The current and former heads of Indo-Pacific Command have warned about China’s building the necessary forces to invade and conquer Taiwan, possibly by decade’s end. Given China’s long-standing determination to make Taiwan part of the mainland and achieve “one China,” a military takeover of Taiwan sounds plausible. **However, this notion is based on a fundamental misperception regarding China’s capability to launch a major amphibious assault.** If China were to launch such a military attack on Taiwan, what would that take in terms of forces and force levels? Does China possess the requisite numbers and capabilities? If not, when, if at all, might it build those forces that, if history counts, would number in the hundreds of thousands of troops and thousands of ships and maritime assault vehicles? Current and past studies do not successfully or specifically address these questions. These studies focus on the how, but not on the specific manpower requirements of what would be required to carry out an invasion. The definitive document on what size force would be required to seize Taiwan in a full-out landing was drafted by the US military in the late stages of World War II in the Pacific. In 1944, Operation Causeway was the US plan for retaking Formosa, as it was then called, from 30,000 starving Japanese soldiers. The planned invasion force was double the size of Operation Overlord, the Normandy landing: 400,000 soldiers and marines deployed on 4,000 ships. With a potential defending force of 450,000 Taiwanese today, using the traditional three-to-one ratio of attackers to defenders taught at war colleges, China would need to deploy over 1.2 million soldiers (out of a total active force of over 2 million). Many thousands of ships would be required to land all those forces, and doing so would take weeks. How many occupation forces would be required to pacify the Taiwanese? Surely the lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq are not lost on the PLA leadership. **China possesses a small fraction of the necessary ships to execute a landing of that size and lacks the capacity to do so for the foreseeable future. Nor are there any current plans suggesting China is intent on procuring such a force, though that could change. Further, Taiwan is not conducive to any form of amphibious assault. A handful of landing sites on the west coast are blocked by proximate mountainous areas running the length of the 250-mile-long island, some approaching 10,000 feet in height.** Defenders could fall back using this difficult terrain to wage a guerrilla war. Moreover, **Taiwan lacks the infrastructure to support over a million invaders and their logistical needs, most of which would have to come from the mainland.** Fixating on an unlikely scenario, no matter how compelling it sounds, skews US resources and force levels.

### AT Authoritarianism

**No impact to authoritarianism – it’s media hype**

**Leong ’19** [Ho Wai Clarence Leong holds an MSc from the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and an MA in English and Modern History from the University of St. Andrews, is the Asia newswire editor for Dow Jones, “In an age of authoritarianism, the world sees glimmers of hope,” 3-19-19, <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Progress-Watch/2019/0319/In-an-age-of-authoritarianism-the-world-sees-glimmers-of-hope>]

In the past year, citizens of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Ethiopia have taken to the streets to demand accountability from their governments, while voters in Malaysia and the Maldives ousted corrupt governments at the ballot box. Countries with a strong civil society or decent-sized middle class continue to push back against autocrats, even though the headlines are more often about the threats to democracy. That’s not to say democracy has nothing to worry about. A new paper published this month found that the world has been in “a wave of autocratization” since 1994, and as many as 75 democracies have seen a reversal to autocracy. Modern-day autocrats know better than to blatantly shore up power, but do so gradually and under a legal facade, making it harder to detect, researchers say. Autocrats pit authoritarianism against democracy, promoting it as a more efficient form of governance and spreading the technology that strengthens control. Social media amplifies the spread of misinformation, clouding voters’ judgment. Global freedom, which is composed of political rights and civil liberties, has been in decline for the 13th year in a row, according to a new report from Freedom House. But the same report also notes significant improvement in accountability for corruption in Angola, Armenia, and other nations. Political participation in most parts of the world has seen a continuous upward trend, reports The Economist. And while **autocrats** threaten democracies, they **are** also “**fueling a powerful counterattack**,” Human Rights Watch notes in its latest annual report. “Those who are bemoaning this authoritarian turn in the world were overstating the case,” says Steven Levitsky, a political scientist at Harvard and co-author of “How Democracies Die.” The euphoric expansion of democracy in the 1990s led to the over-optimistic belief that authoritarianism was a thing of the past, and now that expectation has been dashed, he says. But “there’s yet to emerge a real, viable, truly legitimate alternative to democracy in the world.” That doesn’t discount the fact that people are disillusioned with traditional political parties and losing confidence in democracy. But rather than disengaging from it, that dissatisfaction is driving citizens to participate in political processes, according to The Economist. Voter turnout and membership of political parties rose, reversing a downward trend. A larger proportion of the world’s population is now willing to engage in lawful demonstrations. The Economist also notes a particularly striking area of progress coming from female participation in politics. “Women have become much more active, not just in [the] U.S. but around the world,” says Steven Leslie, lead analyst at The Economist Intelligence Unit. “There is an ongoing surge of female participation in politics and in activities that are essential to democracy.” Barriers like discriminatory laws and socioeconomic obstacles are gradually being removed. In Rwanda and Ethiopia, half of the cabinet ministers are women. New legislation in Japan encourages gender parity in parliament. In the United States, the voters in the November midterms elected the highest number of women to Congress in history – though they still make up only 23.7 percent. Still, the international atmosphere has become less favorable to the expansion of democracy. Not only is the totalitarian state of China spreading its influence, but cracks are appearing in decades-old alliances such as the European Union and NATO. In the EU, both Italy and Turkey saw their rankings in The Economist’s democracy index fall by at least 10 places. Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, the U.S. is becoming more isolationist, analysts say. “America’s commitment to the global progress of democracy in its foreign policy has been seriously compromised,” says Sarah Repucci, senior director for research and analysis at Freedom House. In one example, when the U.S. withdrew from the council on human rights at the United Nations, it left “a huge vacuum of power,” says Rosa Freedman, a professor of law, conflict, and global development at the University of Reading in England and author of several books on the U.N. Despite the downward trends, however, **countries are forming new alliances to put pressure on repressive regimes**, reports Human Rights Watch. It points to the example of the EU and a group of Muslim-majority countries working together to create a mechanism at the U.N. to collect evidence on the ethnic cleansing of Rohingyas, which could be used in future trials of the Myanmar government. A group of Latin American countries led a resolution in the Human Rights Council to condemn the severe persecution of Venezuelans under President Nicolás Maduro. Other human rights mechanisms have sprung up in unexpected places, adds Joseph Saunders, deputy program director at Human Rights Watch. For example, the organizing bodies of big sports tournaments, such as the World Cup and the Olympics, will scrutinize the bidders and hosts’ human rights records. “These are obviously dark times,” says Mr. Saunders. “But [you] miss a large part of the picture if you don’t see the pushback that is also happening.”

**No impact to authoritarians – they’re unsustainable and can’t mobilize**

**Ganesh ’20** [Janan Ganesh was a Researcher at the Policy Exchange and is the principal political columnist with the Financial Times, “Bonhomie but no brotherhood: The authoritarian bloc that never was,” 4-22-20, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/us/bonhomie-but-no-brotherhood-the-authoritarian-bloc-that-never-was-1.4235287]

Bill Hicks, the late comic and grouch, dreamt of a political party for “people who hate people”. He just couldn’t get them to come together in the same room. The great egoist movement was undone by its central principle. I think of the skit whenever the world brotherhood of jingoist authoritarians is talked up. US president Donald Trump is in this group, with, among others, the leaders of China (Xi Jinping), Russia (Vladimir Putin), India (Narendra Modi) and Brazil (Jair Bolsonaro). Trump and Xi are superpower rivals, America cancelled India’s preferential trading status, and still the idea of a Nationalist International survives. It should not survive the coronavirus pandemic. Recent months have further teased out the differences between these conflated governments. Their domestic autocracy is real enough, but their coherence as a bloc is overstated. **Liberalism is not confronted by anything like a unified opponent**. The most vivid case in point is the US-China blame-game. It is also the least surprising. Relations were dire before the virus, and it should not be news that nativists feud more easily than they collude across national lines. World war allusions have flowed too cheaply of late, but it is hard not to think of the autocrats who mercifully failed to act in concert for long in the previous century. Leaders who believe in the separateness of nations above all else will always have trouble co-ordinating. As long as this is true, the position of **liberal democracy is less exposed than it sometimes looks**. What its enemies have in numbers and geographic spread they lack in togetherness. At present, they cannot agree on the efficacy of the World Health Organisation. The prospect of a new world order built around their shared preferences seems far off. As telling as the diplomatic schisms between nationalists is their range of antivirus policies. Mainstream governments have converged on much the same strategy, couched in much the same language. It is true enough that some were quicker than others and some were better prepared to begin with. As lives are at issue, the stragglers should be held to eventual account. Free-for-all But as time passes, what distinguishes the approaches of, say, France, Canada and Ireland, lies in the details. Given how many countries fall into the non-populist category, true outliers such as Sweden, with its minimal lockdown, are amazingly few. Compare this with the free-for-all inside the populist world. Modi has kept the second-largest population on Earth at home for a month. Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, took measures against the virus relatively early. At the opposite end, there is the laxity of Trump and Bolsonaro. **The crisis has exposed how little connects these leaders** beyond a surface bonhomie. Some pretend to be serious about the business of government, some do not. A club that encompasses them all is likely to be meaningless. Notice, too, how gaping are its exit doors. By embracing a shutdown, however tardily, and not talking up a relaxation, Boris Johnson is viewed ever more as a “normal” leader. At least before his illness, the UK premier was counted unambiguously among the nativists. Scott Morrison, the Australian prime minister, after tackling the virus seriously, has undergone a similar reassignment. The nationalist team roster has thinned in a few weeks, which tells you how much rigour the idea ever had. And this is not just about personalities. There are theoretical contradictions within populism. This is a creed that cannot decide what it thinks about personal freedom. It resents technocratic bossiness while brooking no checks and balances in the protection of the homeland. Trump claims “total authority”, yes, but to loosen restrictions on people, not to tighten them (except for would-be immigrants). If this tension is evident in one leader, imagine its permutations for policy across several governments across several continents across several issues. Even according an “-ism” to such a disparate bunch is to flatter them. It is understandable that we do. We are a pattern-recognising species, and sometimes a pattern-inventing one. It is consoling to detect some kind of shape to the world. But the point is to not make the pattern itself more frightening than anarchic reality. No doubt, the momentum has been with authoritarians in recent times. The question is whether they add up to a cohesive front against democracy. An empire of illiberalism, on which the sun never sets, assumes more unity than could feasibly exist among national egoists. It just took a crisis to show it.

### AT Russia Impact

**No escalation- Putin won’t mess with NATO—**invasion is limited

**Dhanesha 2/25** (Neel, reporter for Vox. “How to think about the risk of nuclear war, according to 3 experts” <https://www.vox.com/22951004/nuclear-weapons-russia-ukraine-war-putin> Feb 25, 2022)

The main reason, Bunn said, is that the United States and its NATO allies have made it clear that they will **not send troops** to Ukraine. Without the threat of military **intervention**, Putin has **little reason** to use his nuclear weapons, especially since Russia has a staggering numbers advantage over the Ukrainian military.

“His objective is not to bring the world to **nuclear war**,” said [Paul Hare](https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/profile/paul-webster-hare/), senior lecturer in global studies at Boston University. “His objective is to **simply** swallow Ukraine — and restore not just the [power of the] Soviet Union, but the Tsarist empire.”

#### No war- NATO backs down

**Gardner 2/23** (Frank, “Russia-Ukraine crisis: How likely is it to escalate into broader war?” <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60485766> Feb. 23, 2022)

Let's cut right to the chase here: are we witnessing the prelude to **World War 3?**

Because let's face it, that is what a lot of people are understandably asking and thinking in the light of the Kremlin's recent actions over Ukraine - actions and statements that have triggered a deluge of denouncements and sanctions from the West.

**No**. As bad as the situation on the Russia-Ukraine border is right now, it does not currently involve a direct military confrontation between Nato and Russia.

In fact, when the US and Britain watched in dismay as Russia built up a force capable of invading Ukraine, they swiftly pulled out their small number of military trainers and advisers.